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Abstract For a long time, insight problem solving has
been either understood as nothing special or as a particular
class of problem solving. The first view implicates the
necessity to find efficient heuristics that restrict the search
space, the second, the necessity to overcome self-imposed
constraints. Recently, promising hybrid cognitive models
attempt to merge both approaches. In this vein, we were
interested in the interplay of constraints and heuristic
search, when problem solvers were asked to solve a diffi-
cult multi-step problem, the ten-penny problem. In three
experimental groups and one control group (N = 4 9 30)
we aimed at revealing, what constraints drive problem
difficulty in this problem, and how relaxing constraints,
and providing an efficient search criterion facilitates the
solution. We also investigated how the search behavior of
successful problem solvers and non-solvers differ. We
found that relaxing constraints was necessary but not suf-
ficient to solve the problem. Without efficient heuristics
that facilitate the restriction of the search space, and testing
the progress of the problem solving process, the relaxation
of constraints was not effective. Relaxing constraints and
applying the search criterion are both necessary to effec-
tively increase solution rates. We also found that successful
solvers showed promising moves earlier and had a higher
maximization and variation rate across solution attempts.
We propose that this finding sheds light on how different
strategies contribute to solving difficult problems. Finally,
we speculate about the implications of our findings for
insight problem solving.
Introduction
Having an insight when solving a difficult problem can be
characterized as a moment of full comprehension of a
solution (Sternberg, & Davidson, 1995). Understanding the
underlying cognitive processes of this phenomenon seems
to be a promising way to learn more about the foundations
of creative, innovative, out-of-the-box thinking (Dietrich,
& Kanso, 2010; Gardner, 1978; Perkins, 1981). Our study
sheds light on the importance of search processes and
relaxation of constraints when solving a difficult problem.
Search and constraints
Two cognitive theories try to explain insight problem solving:
the ‘‘nothing special’’ approach and the representational
change theory.Kaplan and Simon (1990) assumed that insight
problems are nothing special (see O¨llinger,&Knoblich, 2009;
Sternberg, & Davidson, 1995): they are like other problems,
and it is only their huge or ill-defined search space that makes
them difficult to solve. Often an exhaustive search is impos-
sible, so the problem solver has to find the right heuristics to
attain the solution.KaplanandSimon (1990) demonstrated for
the mutilated checkerboard problem that search can be
& Michael O¨llinger
michael.oellinger@parmenides-foundation.org
1 Parmenides Center for the Study of Thinking, Kirchplatz 1,
82049 Pullach, Germany
2 Psychological Department, Ludwig-Maximilians-University,
Pullach, Germany
3 MTA-ELTE Theoretical Biology and Evolutionary Ecology
Research Group, Biological Institute, Eo¨tvo¨s University,
Budapest, Hungary
4 Institute for Medical Psychology and Behavioural
Neurobiology, University Tu¨bingen, Tu¨bingen, Germany
5 Parmenides Center for the Conceptual Foundations of
Science, Pullach, Germany
123
Psychological Research
DOI 10.1007/s00426-016-0800-3
facilitated by increasing the saliency of crucial problem fea-
tures, which in turn increases the solution rate. Based on this
idea, MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle (2001) built a
computational model for the nine-dot problem, probably the
most well-known insight problem (Burnham, & Davis, 1969;
Chronicle, Ormerod, & MacGregor, 2001; Kershaw, &
Ohlsson, 2004; Lung, & Dominowski, 1985; MacGregor
et al., 2001; Maier, 1930). The task is to connect nine dots,
arranged in a 3 9 3 matrix, by four connected straight lines
(Fig. 1). MacGregor et al. postulated that two heuristics are
crucial for the solution: the maximization heuristic states that
each move should connect as many dots as possible; the
progress monitoring heuristic tests the ratio of remaining
moves and unconnected dots after each move. The authors
suggested that the higher the mental look-ahead value, the
more likely problem solvers realize that the problem space
needs to be extended. For instance, a personwith a look-ahead
value of twomayplan to connect three dotswith the firstmove
and two dots with the secondmove. As can be seen in Fig. 1b,
it is impossible to connect the remaining four dots with the
remaining two straight lines.MacGregor et al. (2001) assumed
that this might be the moment, when the problem solver starts
looking for new and ‘‘promising’’ moves, like drawing lines
outside the given 3 9 3 grid (see Fig. 1c). A person with a
look-ahead value of one would need to draw one more line
before realizing that the solution is impossible.
All in all, heuristics explain how people restrict the
search space and realize that the current search space is not
sufficient, but they do not explain how people come up
with the new search space.
Ohlsson (1992, 2011) proposed the representational
change theory (RCT), which provides a mechanism exactly
for that. The idea is that prior knowledge constraints or
perceptual groupings are changed by mechanisms like con-
straint relaxation (Isaak, & Just, 1995) or chunk decompo-
sition (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999). In
more detail, it is supposed that activation of information in
the working memory alters the related long-term memory
activation pattern, and eventually might help to realize pre-
viously unrecognized knowledge elements or actions
(Ohlsson 1992, 2011 Chaps. 3–5). For example, in the nine-
dot problem, people start with an overconstrained search
space, and keep their lines inside the 3 9 3 grid, where they
fail repeatedly. A representational change resolves the per-
ceptual grouping so that problem solvers can draw lines
outside the grid, to non-dot locations (see Fig. 1c). The
representational change nicely explains how a problem
representation and so the resulting search space is changed.
However, to equal insight with relaxing a single source
of difficulty could be misleading (Scheerer, 1963; Weis-
berg, & Alba, 1981a, b). It was demonstrated that telling
people about the main source of difficulty either directly or
via transfer tasks does not necessarily increase the solution
rate (Kershaw, Flynn, & Gordon, 2013; Lung, & Domi-
nowski, 1985; O¨llinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2014; Weis-
berg, & Alba, 1981a, b). A few theoretical accounts
combined heuristics with the representational change the-
ory, and avoided the single cause of difficulty assumption
(Kershaw, & Ohlsson, 2004; Ohlsson, 1984, 1992, 2011).
Jones (2003) investigated the interplay between heuristic
search and representational change. He showed that both
are necessary for insight problem solving, and that they can
be differentiated by move selection and eye-movement
patterns (see also Knoblich, O¨llinger, & Spivey, 2005, for a
review). Kershaw et al. (2013) and Kershaw and Ohlsson
(2004) demonstrated that prior knowledge, processing of
problem information, and perceptual aspects of the prob-
lem are multiple causes of difficulty. Recently, O¨llinger
et al. (2014) suggested that insight problem solving could
be characterized by stages of search and representational
change. They proposed that in the nine-dot problem, search
plays the dominant role initially. At this stage—as
MacGregor et al. (2001) convincingly showed—partici-
pants rely on a maximization heuristic, i.e., they try to
connect as many dots as possible with each line. After
repeated failures, successful solvers change the problem
representation that results in an expanded search space.
Importantly, this new search space is much larger and has
to be restricted by heuristics too, to guide the search. This
might explain, why relaxing a constraint by cues (Weis-
berg, & Alba, 1981a, b) without having the right heuristics
(MacGregor et al., 2001) fails, as well as why heuristics
Fig. 1 a The initial
configuration of the nine-dot
problem. b A solution attempt
with the first two moves that
connect five dots. The numbers
indicate the sequence of moves.
c A solution of the nine-dot
problem
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fail, if they are applied at the inappropriate search space
(O¨llinger et al., 2014).
The current study
We investigated how constraint relaxation and an appro-
priate maximization criterion might drive the problem
solving process and how successful problem solvers differ
from unsuccessful problem solvers. To investigate these
questions, we used the ten-penny problem (Dow, & Mayer,
2004). The instruction is: ‘‘Show how you can arrange ten
pennies so that you have five rows of four pennies in each
row’’. The solution of the problem is shown in Fig. 2a. The
figure might seem confusing until lines are drawn between
the dots to form a pentagram (Fig. 2b).
In the nine-dot problem, search and maximization are
important both before and after the representational change
(Kershaw, & Ohlsson, 2004; O¨llinger et al., 2014). Before
the representational change the search space is restricted by
the perceptual constraint but it is still large (see also Ker-
shaw, & Ohlsson, 2004), so it takes some time before the
problem solver realizes that it is impossible to solve the
problem within the perceptual boundaries. After the rep-
resentational change, the search space becomes unre-
stricted, in fact, infinite, since the problem solver realizes
that she can draw lines to non-dot points. At this point, a
maximization heuristic plays an important role to direct
search (MacGregor et al., 2001), and a large spatial
working memory capacity is beneficial for solving the
problem (Chein, Weisberg, Streeter, & Kwok, 2010).
In contrast, for the ten-penny problem, the search space
is infinite from the beginning, and it might overstrain the
working memory to manipulate ten single items. Manipu-
lating pennies seems to be a constraint that problem solvers
have to overcome to realize that they can manipulate the
five lines (along which they arrange the pennies) instead.
Paradoxically, relaxing the pennies constraint restricts the
search space (Kaplan, & Simon, 1990; Knoblich et al.,
1999; Ohlsson, 1992, see below), whereas in the nine-dot
problem constraint relaxation expands the search space.
Using lines is also a precondition for applying an efficient
maximization criterion: to maximize the intersections of
lines (MacGregor et al., 2001). All in all, both multi-step
problems require the concerted interplay of representa-
tional change and heuristic search, but these factors might
have different importance within the problem solving
process of the two problems.
Hypotheses: We predict that the difficulty of the ten-
penny problem is caused by the following two constraints:
1. Pennies constraint: problem solvers start out with the
assumption that they have to manipulate single pen-
nies. When they overcome this constraint, they start
using lines (rows of pennies) to arrange the pennies,
which reduces the complexity of the task.
2. Separate rows constraint: problem solvers assume that
pennies have to be arranged in separate rows, i.e., rows
do not intersect. The key to the solution is to use
intersecting rows where the pennies at the intersections
are part of more than one row.
There could be another constraint that problem solvers
assume that pennies have to be of equal distance to each
other. We think that this is only a minor constraint and left
it out of consideration in this study.
We also predict that besides these constraints there is also
an important process factor (Kershaw, & Ohlsson, 2004).
One has to draw lines so that the number of intersectionswith
the already drawn lines is maximal (equals to the number of
already drawn lines). Each line has to intersect with all other
lines, so each line has to have exactly four intersections (see
Fig. 2, maximization criterion).
Consequently, we hypothesized that to solve the ten-
penny problem, one has to overcome the hypothesized
constraints and has to apply a maximization criterion.
Thus, we predicted that providing hints about these factors
would increase solution rate.
To test our hypotheses, we introduced three experi-
mental groups and a control group. In the line group (LG),
participants received a hint that using lines instead of single
pennies would help to solve the problem. In the intersec-
tion group (IG), participants were informed additionally
that intersections of lines would help to solve the problem.
In the maximization group (MG) problem solvers received
the hints about lines and intersections and were also
informed that each line should have four intersections. The
control group (CG) did not receive any hints.
Fig. 2 a Solution of the ten-
penny problem with pennies.
b Solution of the ten-penny
problem using lines,
intersections, and pennies. c A
typical solution of the problem
by one of our participants
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We predicted that the solution rate of all experimental
groups would benefit from the provided hints. We expected
the following rank order for the solution rate
MG[ IG[LG[CG. We predicted a solution rate near
100 % in the maximization group.
A second aim of our study was to investigate how
successful problem solvers differ from unsuccessful ones.
We hypothesized, as an extension of MacGregor et al.
(2001) heuristic approach, that successful solvers would
show a higher variation in their solution attempts. This
means that successful problem solving behavior is char-
acterized using different strategies, and repeating solution
attempts less frequently. According to MacGregor et al.
successful solvers realize the necessity of searching for
new problem states, if the initial approach fails to attain the
criterion. That is, solvers would outperform non-solvers in
the variance of their applied moves. Our argumentation is
in close vicinity to the notion of mental set (Birch, &
Rabinowitz, 1951; Chi, & Snyder, 2011; Lovett, &
Anderson, 1996; Luchins, & Luchins, 1994; O¨llinger,
Jones, & Knoblich, 2008; Werner, & Raab, 2013). Mental
set occurs when the repeated activation of a solution pro-
cedure increases the likelihood of selecting this very pro-
cedure in the future, irrespective of the existence of
simpler, more efficient alternative strategies (Lovett, &
Anderson, 1996), thus hindering the solution of the prob-
lem. We assumed that variation, as the counterpart of
repetition, would correlate with solution rate.
Methods
Participants
120 participants, 42 male, were recruited via e-mails, and
flyers at local universities of Munich. Most of them were
students receiving course credit for participating in psycho-
logical studies, others were paid 7€. The median age was
25 years (range 18–58). The four groups did not differ with
respect to age according to a one-way ANOVA, F(3,
112) = .59; p = .62. Participants were randomly assigned to
either the control group or to one of the experimental groups
(line group, intersection group, or maximization group).
Materials
Participants received white, blank DIN A4 papers to draw
their solution attempts.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. They
gave informed consent. They received the following writ-
ten instructions (in German).
Imagine you have ten pennies. Arrange the pennies so
that you have five rows of four pennies in each row.
Please use paper and pencil to draw your solution
attempts. Please number your solution attempts
consecutively.
The time limit was 15 min. In the three experimental
groups, participants received hints after 5 min. The line
group received the following hint: For solving the prob-
lem, it could be helpful to use lines instead of pennies.
The intersection group received the following hint: For
solving the problem, it could be helpful to use lines
instead of pennies, and regard the intersections of lines as
places where pennies rest. The maximization group
received the following hint: For solving the problem, it
could be helpful to regard the intersections of lines as
places where pennies rest. Please try to draw five lines,
so that each line has exactly four intersections with the
rest of the lines.
Design
The between-subject factor was group and the dependent
measures were solution rate, the proportion of different
strategies, maximization score and variation score before
and after the hint (see the definition of these variables later)
(Table 1).
Data analysis
Strategies
According to our hypotheses, we defined three strategies
(see examples in Fig. 3):
Table 1 Design
Group 0–5 min 5–15 min
Control group (CG) No hint No hint
Line group (LG) No hint ‘‘Use lines’’
Intersection group (IG) No hint ‘‘Use lines and intersections’’
Maximization group (MG) No hint ‘‘Maximize the number of intersections’’
Except CG all groups were provided with hints after 5 min
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• Penny strategy: there are no lines in the figure, just
circles or dots (see Fig. 3a, b).
• Line strategy: there are lines in the figure, but they do
not intersect. Pennies are either represented in the
figure or not (Fig. 3c).
• Intersection strategy: there are intersecting lines in the
figure. Intersections could be in the middle of lines
(Fig. 3d) or at the end points (Fig. 3e); they could be at
any angle. Pennies are either represented in the figure or
not.
We identified one strategy for each figure (solution
attempt) that the participants drew. For figures identified
with intersection strategy, we counted the number of
intersections (for figures identified with any other strat-
egy, this value was zero per definition). The experimenter
marked which figures were drawn before and after the
hint.
31 attempts (9 in CG, 17 in LG, 4 in IG, and 1 in the
MG) out of 1229 total attempts (2.5 %) were not clas-
sifiable (e.g., the participants drew written statements or
formulas instead of drawings) and were excluded. When
using the intersection strategy, sometimes problem sol-
vers used more than five lines (in 94 solution attempts
out of the total 1198). We classified these attempts as
intersection strategy, but we did not count the number of
intersections, because the number could be higher than
10. We treated these cases as missing data for the
number of intersections.
Since we were interested in the effect of hints, we
excluded those participants who solved the task before
5 min elapsed (four participants).
Maximization score
To compare the search behavior of solvers and non-solvers,
we operationalized maximization behavior by applying the
following scoring system. Each solution attempt was
scored ?1, -1 or 0, depending on the order of the solution
attempts and their strategies. The first attempt was scored 0
if it was a penny strategy and it was scored ?1 if it was a
line strategy or an intersection strategy. Then, each con-
secutive solution attempt was scored ?1 if it had a ‘‘higher
order’’ strategy than the previous one, 0 if it had the same
strategy, and -1 if it had a ‘‘lower order’’ strategy. The
order of strategies was penny strategy\ line strat-
egy\ intersection strategy. Intersection strategies with
more intersections were considered ‘‘higher order’’ than
intersection strategies with less intersections. Then, we
calculated the maximization score by averaging the scores
separately for the first 5 min and for 5–15 min. The max-
imization score hypothetically ranges from -1 to ?1.
Here,weprovide a hypothetical sequenceof strategies after
a hint to illustrate the scoring (penny strategy = ps; line
strategy = ls; intersection strategy = is): hint ? ps ? ps
? ls ? ps ? is (three intersections) ? is (1 intersec-
tion) ? is (eight intersections) ? is (10 intersections).
Scores: ps (0), ps (0), ls (1), ps (-1), is (1), is (-1), is (1), is (1).
Maximization score after hint = 2/8 = 0.25.
Variation rate
As a measure of variation we defined the number of ?1
scores and -1 scores (see above) as change, both indicat-
ing changes in search strategy, and 0 as repetition, and then
Fig. 3 Examples for different
strategies: a, b penny strategy,
c line strategy, d intersection
strategy with seven
intersections, e intersection
strategy with five intersections
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normalized it with the number of solution attempts. A
number of 0 would mean that the participant used the
penny strategy all the time. A number of 1 would indicate
that the participant started with the line or the intersection
strategy and changed strategies in each consecutive solu-
tion attempt.
Number of attempts
We compared the number of solution attempts (fig-
ures drawn) between solvers and non-solvers.
Results
For our analyses, we used a 5 % significance level and all our
statistical tests were two tailed. For nominal data, we used v2
tests and estimated the effect size by U coefficient. The data
analysis on selected strategies, maximization scores, varia-
tion scores and solution attempts were evaluated by separate
one-way ANOVAs before and after hints. Additionally, a
reviewer of an earlier version of this manuscript suggested to
calculate the differences in thesemeasures between after and
before the hint to estimate the amount of change induced by
the hint and to compare the groups based on these values. For
ANOVAs, we reported gp
2 for estimating the effect size. For
t tests, we determined Cohen’s d as effect size.
We divided the results section into three parts. First, we
report results that serve as evidence for the hypothesized
sources of problem difficulty. Second, we analyzed the
impact of hints on problem solving behavior, finally we
provide a binary logistic regression analysis assessing the
influence of different predictors on the solution rate.
Sources of difficulty
Pennies strategy
We controlled whether groups differed in the usage of the
pennies strategy before 5 min. An ANOVA of the groups
(CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed no statistically significant
effect, F(3, 115) = .74, p[ .52, gp
2 = .02. Post hoc com-
parisons revealed no significant differences between the
groups. Table 2 shows the number of participants who had
a variation rate of zero, i.e., who used the pennies strategy
exclusively. Before 5 min elapsed, there were a high
number of participants with 0 variation rate. We did not
find significant differences by pairwise v2 tests (ps[ .40)
between groups. After receiving hints, almost all partici-
pants dropped the pennies strategy. Pairwise v2 tests
(Fisher’s exact test) showed significant differences between
the CG and all other groups: CG and LG, v2(1, 59) = 8.68,
p\ .003, U = .38, CG and IG, v2(1, 58) = 8.68, p\ .02,
U = .32, and CG and MG, v2(1, 59) = 11.64, p\ .001,
U = .44.
Intersection strategy
We checked whether the hints affected the frequency of
solution attempts with intersection strategy. For each par-
ticipant, we calculated the percentage of solution attempts
that was categorized as intersection strategy, separately for
the solution attempts before and after 5 min (see Fig. 4).
Before 5 min, the percentage of solution attempts catego-
rized as intersection strategy was quite low in all groups.
After the hint, it increased, especially in the intersection
group and the maximization group.
Table 2 Number of participants who had a variation rate of zero
Group Before 5 min After 5 min
Control group 18/30 (60 %) 10 (33 %)
Line group 17/29 (59 %) 1 (3 %)
Intersection group 13/28 (46 %) 2 (7 %)
Maximization group 17/29 (59 %) 0 (0 %)
Fig. 4 Percentage of solution
attempts categorized as
intersection strategy across
groups. Black bars intersection
attempts before 5 min, gray
bars intersection attempts after
5 min. At 5 min, a hint was
provided for the experimental
groups. The bars represent the
average value; the whiskers
represent SE
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Before 5 min, a one-way ANOVA with the between-
subject factor groups (CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed no sta-
tistically significant effect, F(3, 115) = .82, p[ .60,
gp
2 = .02. After 5 min, the percentage of solution attempts
categorized as intersection strategy varied with the exper-
imental condition. A one-way ANOVA with the between-
subject factor groups (CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed a highly
significant effect, F(3, 115) = 30.68, p\ .0001, gp
2 = .45.
Post hoc comparisons (Scheffe´) revealed highly significant
differences between the control group and all experimental
groups (p\ .01). The line group differed significantly from
the intersection group (p\ .05) and from the maximization
group (p\ .01). There was no difference between the
intersection group and the maximization group.
We further assessed the impact of hints, by comparing the
increase in intersection strategy after 5 min (calculated as
the percentage of solution attempts with intersection strategy
after the hint minus before the hint), across groups. A one-
way ANOVA with the between-subject factor groups (CG,
LG, IG, MG) revealed a highly significant effect, F(3,
115) = 18.36, p\ .0001, gp
2 = .33. Post hoc comparisons
(Scheffe´) revealed highly significant differences between the
control group and all experimental groups (p\ .01).
Maximization score
Figure 5 shows the average maximization score (see
‘‘Data analysis’’ section) for each group. Before the hint,
these were positive, but close to zero (Fig. 5 black bars).
After the hint, the value in the maximization group
showed a pronounced increase and the intersection group
showed a somewhat smaller increase (Fig. 5 gray bars).
Before the hint, a one-way ANOVA with the factor
groups (CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed no significant dif-
ference between groups, F(3, 115) = .73, p[ .50,
gp
2 = .02. After the hint, a one-way ANOVA with the
factor groups (CG, LG, IG, MG) showed a reliable
difference, F(3, 115) = 24.89, p\ .0001, gp
2 = .40. Post
hoc comparisons (Scheffe´) indicated that the maximiza-
tion group differed highly significantly from all other
groups (p\ .01). There was no other significant differ-
ence between groups. To rule out the possibility that the
effect was caused by the higher amount of solvers in the
maximization group, we excluded the solution move
from the analysis, since the solution move added a value
of ?1. A one-way ANOVA revealed a highly significant
effect for the factor group, F(3, 109) = 12.29,
p\ .0001, gp
2 = .26. Post hoc tests (Scheffe´) revealed
significant differences between the maximization group
and all other groups (p\ .01).
To evaluate the amount of increase of maximization due
to the hint, we calculated the difference of maximization
scores after 5 min minus before 5 min for each group. A
one-way ANOVA with the between-subject factor groups
(CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed a highly significant effect, F(3,
115) = 12.80, p\ .0001, gp
2 = .26. Post hoc comparisons
(Scheffe´) revealed highly significant differences between the
maximization group and all other groups (p\ .01). There
were no further significant differences between the groups.
Hints, solution rate, and variation
Solution rate
We compared the solution rate (Table 3) across all
groups by pairwise v2 tests. The difference was signifi-
cant between MG and all other groups: CG and MG,
v2(1, 59) = 23.80, p\ .0001, U = .64; LG and MG,
v2(1, 58) = 26.01, p\ .0001, U = .67; IG and MG v2(1,
57) = 14.85, p\ .0001, U = .51. These p values are
considered significant even if we apply the conservative
Bonferroni correction for multiple tests (.05/6 = .0083).
There was no other significant difference between
groups.
Fig. 5 Average maximization
score across groups. Black bars
maximization score before
5 min, gray bars maximization
score after 5 min. After 5 min, a
hint was provided in the
experimental groups. The bars
represent the average value; the
whiskers represent SE
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Variation rate
We tested whether the four groups differed in the variation
rate of their solution attempts. We did two separate anal-
yses for the data before 5 min and after 5 min. As Fig. 6
illustrates the variation rate before 5 min was very similar
in each group. A one-way ANOVA with the factor groups
(CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed no significant difference
between the groups, F(3, 115) = 1.26, p[ .30, gp
2 = .03.
After 5 min, the line, intersection, and maximization
groups showed a pronounced increase in variation rates
(Fig. 6 gray bars). A one-way ANOVA with the factor
groups (CG, LG, IG, MG) showed a reliable difference,
F(3, 115) = 15.78, p\ .001, gp
2 = .30. Post hoc compar-
isons (Scheffe´) indicated that the maximization group dif-
fered highly significantly from all other groups (ps\ .01).
The intersection group differed significantly form the
control group (p\ .05), and the line group showed a
marginal difference from the control group p = .05.
To evaluate the amount of increase of variation between
groups due to the hint, we computed the difference of
variation score after 5 min minus before 5 min for each
group. A one-way ANOVA with the between-subject factor
groups (CG, LG, IG, MG) revealed a highly significant
effect, F(3, 115) = 8.57, p\ .001, gp
2 = .19. Post hoc
comparisons (Scheffe´) revealed highly significant differ-
ences between the maximization group and the intersection
group as well as between the maximization group and the
control group (p\ .01). There were no further significant
differences between the groups.
Solvers and non-solvers
We were interested whether solvers systematically differed
from non-solvers, irrespective of group. We compared
solvers and non-solvers with respect to the number of
participants that made intersections before the hint, and to
the variation rate of solution attempts.
Intersections
Our prediction was that solvers are more likely to realize the
importance of using intersections than non-solvers, even
before the hint (MacGregor et al., 2001). In total, there were
32 solvers and 84 non-solvers (see Table 3). We found that
47 % of solvers (15 participants), and 26 % of non-solvers
(22 participants) used intersections before 5 min. A v2 test
comparing the categories (1 = intersection before hint,
0 = no intersection before hint) between solvers and non-
solvers revealed a significant effect, v2(1, 116) = 4.56,
p\ .05, U = .20, indicating that there is an association
between using the intersection strategy in the first 5 min and
being a solver. The effect would even be more pronounced,
if we included the four solvers that solved the problem
without any hint, since all of them used intersections.
Variation rate
We tested whether solvers showed a higher variation rate
than non-solvers. We found an average variation rate of .43
(SD .24) for non-solvers, and .59 (SD .24) for solvers. An
independent groups t test (solver, non-solver) revealed a
significant main effect, t(114) = 3.10, p = .01, Cohen’s
d = .67, indicating a medium effect size.
Table 3 Solution rates across groups
Group Number of solvers/group size (%)
Control group (CG) 3/30 (10 %)
Line group (LG) 2/29 (7 %)
Intersection group (IG) 6/28 (21 %)
Maximization group (MG) 21/29 (72 %)
Fig. 6 Average variation score
across groups. Black and gray
bars variation rate before and
after 5 min, respectively. After
5 min, a hint was provided in
the experimental groups. The
bars represent the average
value; the whiskers represent SE
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Number of attempts
We tested whether solvers and non-solvers differed in the
number of their solution attempts. Non-solvers made an
average number of 10.93 attempts (SD 4.91), in contrast
solvers made 8.41 (SD 2.76). An independent groups t test
(solver, non-solver) revealed a significant main effect,
t(114) = 2.74, p = .01, Cohen’s d = .62, indicating a
medium effect size.
Binary logistic regression: condition, variation,
and maximization
We evaluated the predictive value of the number of solu-
tion attempts, maximization scores and variation scores for
solving the ten-penny problem. We conducted a binary
logistic regression analysis (BLR) (Hosmer, & Lemeshow,
2000). BLR provides a method of analyzing the influence
of dichotomous, discrete, or continuous predictors on a
binary outcome variable, and has already been successfully
applied to the analysis of insight problem solving (Kershaw
et al., 2013; O¨llinger et al., 2014). BLR produces B values,
and odds ratios. B values indicate the direction of the
relationship; odds ratios indicate, for example, the likeli-
hood that a participant in a particular group can be cate-
gorized as a solver, e.g., an odds ratio of 2 of a particular
group illustrates that a participant of this group is two times
more likely to solve the problem than for the baseline (CG)
condition (c.f. O¨llinger et al., 2014).
We entered two blocks in the model. The first block
included the dummy coded predictor groups (CG, LG, IG,
MG), the maximization and variation rates after 5 min, and
the number of solution attempts. We defined the control
group as reference category. The model of this block was
significant, v2(6, 115) = 63.51, p\ .01, and classified
87.8 % of the data correctly. The Nagelkerke R2 = .61,
showing that 61 % of the variability of the data could be
explained by the model. The model revealed a significant
influence of the two predictor’s maximization after 5 min
and variation after 5 min. The first showed an odds ratio of
2.18 and the second an odds ratio of 3.99. In the second
block, we controlled for the effect of interactions. We
entered all two-way interactions with the predictor groups
(maximization after 5 min 9 group, variation after
5 min 9 group, and attempts 9 groups). Although the
model of block 2 was significant, v2(15, 115) = 96.26,
p\ .01, there were no significant predictors in this model
and the odds ratios of most of the variables were out of
range. This might indicate that too many variables were fit
into the equation. Therefore, we could not further interpret
these results (Table 4).
Discussion
We aimed at investigating the multiple sources of problem
difficulty, and the role of search and constraints in a dif-
ficult multi-step problem, the ten-penny problem. We
hypothesized that a pennies constraint and a separate rows
constraint are parts of the problem difficulty. The first
constrains participants’ problem representation to use sin-
gle pennies to solve the problem (and not lines), the second
constrains participants’ problem representation to arrange
the pennies in separate rows that do not intersect. In three
experimental groups, we gradually relaxed these con-
straints. Additionally, we provided a maximization
heuristic that was intended to guide the search process.
Accordingly, one group was informed to use lines instead
of pennies (line group), a second group received the hint to
use intersection of lines to solve the problem (intersection
group), and a third group was instructed to maximize the
number of intersections (maximization group). The
experimental groups were contrasted with a naı¨ve control
group, which received no hint. We introduced
Table 4 Binary logistic
regression data modeling the
predictive influence of
maximization scores, variation
rate, and the factor group on
solving the problem
Model B SE Wald v2 df Sig. OR 95 % CI
Lower Upper
Block 1
Group 4.10 3 .25
LG -.11 1.08 .01 1 .92 .90 .11 7.42
IG .169 .94 .03 1 .87 1.17 .19 7.32
MG 1.42 .95 2.23 1 .14 4.13 .64 26.45
Max. after 5 min .78 .38 4.30 1 .04* 2.18 1.04 4.57
Variation after 5 min 1.38 .56 6.08 1 .01* 3.99 1.33 12.00
Attempts -.116 .09 1.61 1 .21 .89 .74 1.07
SE standard error, Sig. significance, OR odds ratio, CI confidence interval, LG line group, IG intersection
group, MG maximization group
* Significant effect
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maximization score and variation rate to investigate dif-
ferences in search behavior. We aimed at deciphering the
concerted interplay of heuristics and representational
change when solving a difficult multi-step problem to
elaborate on the ‘‘special view’’ of insight problem solving.
Sources of difficulty
First, we tested whether the hypothesized constraints
(pennies constraint and line constraint) and the maxi-
mization criterion affected the problem solving process.
Analyzing the distribution of zero variation participants
(Table 2) showed that before 5 min (no hints) more than
half of the participants across all groups used pennies
strategy exclusively. This supports our assumption that
using pennies and not lines was a constraint from the
beginning. Providing hints affected the search for alterna-
tive strategies of all experimental groups positively,
whereas the control group still contained a high number of
participants (33 %) that repeated the pennies strategy
throughout the experiment.
All groups significantly differed, except for the inter-
section group and the maximization group, when we
compared them based on the percentage of solution
attempts with the intersection strategy after 5 min
(CG\LG\ IG = MG). This means that all hints effec-
tively increased the probability of using intersections (see
Fig. 4).
Comparing groups based on their maximization score
after 5 min (Fig. 5 gray bars) showed a different pattern.
Only the maximization group differed from the other
groups (CG = LG = IG\MG).
Hints, solution rate, and variation
We tested the effect of hints on problem solving behavior.
We compared groups based on their solution rate, and their
variation rate. We found that the maximization group
performed better than all other groups, with a solution rate
of 72 %. Hinting to use lines (without mentioning the
number of intersections), or hinting to use intersections
(without mentioning the maximization criterion) did not
increase solution rates significantly, compared to the con-
trol group. The following unexpected rank order for the
solution rates was found: CG = LG = IG\MG. This
order mirrors the maximization score pattern.
Comparing variation rates after 5 min (Fig. 6 gray bars)
across groups revealed a different pattern
(CG\LG = IG\MG). When we compared the differ-
ence of the variation scores after 5 min minus before
5 min, the maximization group showed a higher difference
than the intersection group and the control group, but no
other differences were found. While the conclusions from
these statistical tests are less clear, it is safe to say, that the
hints in the maximization group increased the variation rate
more than the other hints.
Solvers and non-solvers
Looking at strategies within the first 5 min revealed that a
higher percentage of solvers (47 %) used intersections
before the hint than non-solvers (26 %). The four partici-
pants that were excluded from the analyses because they
solved the task in less than 5 min also used intersecting
lines for the solution. It seems conceivable that solvers
overcame self-imposed constraints but had no criterion to
restrict the search space at this early stage, and conse-
quently could not monitor the progress of the search pro-
cess properly.
We found that the variation rate differed significantly
between solvers and non-solvers. A lower variation
between attempts might be an indicator for the repetition of
solution approaches that could be the sign of a self-gen-
erated mental set, see zero variation participants in the
control group (Beeftink, van Eerde, & Rutte, 2008; Smith,
1995).
Last, we found that the number of attempts differed
between solvers and non-solvers. Non-solvers made more
attempts, which was expected since they worked on the
problem longer. However, the result is not trivial because it
also indicates that non-solvers did not quit trying to solve
the problem and did not cease problem solving attempts.
Binary logistic regression
Modeling the influence of group, variation and maxi-
mization after 5 min, and the number of attempts showed
that the only significant predictor was variation rate after
5 min and maximization rate after 5 min; that is, higher
variation and maximization rates are positively related to
the solution of the problem. Although the analyses revealed
no significant interaction of any of the chosen predictors
with the predictor group it seems plausible to assume that
in particular the maximization group that showed the
highest maximization and variation rates contribute to this
pattern. It is important to note that the hints of the maxi-
mization group affected multiple sources of problem dif-
ficulty (Kershaw, & Ohlsson, 2004) that helped to increase
the variation and maximization rate.
In sum, relaxing the underlying constrains and having
the insights to use lines and intersections is a necessary
but not sufficient for solving the task. Using lines seemed
to reduce the complexity of the task of manipulating ten
single pennies (grouping). The hint proved insufficient
without finding an appropriate maximization criterion that
helps to monitor the progress against the desired goal
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(MacGregor et al., 2001; O¨llinger, Jones, & Knoblich,
2013a, b; O¨llinger et al., 2014; Ormerod, MacGregor, &
Chronicle, 2002). Interestingly, successful problem sol-
vers were more likely to realize the importance of inter-
secting lines even before the hint, and also showed a
higher variation rate than non-solvers. The importance of
variation and maximization was demonstrated by the
BLR. A maximization criterion provides a mean to
monitor the problem solving progress and to find the goal
configuration of the pennies. The last statement could not
be fully confirmed by our experimental design, since the
maximization group did receive multiple hints (line,
intersection, maximization). An open question remains
whether providing exclusively a hint about a maximiza-
tion criterion increases the solution rate. First of all, we
think that it is almost impossible to find an appropriate
hint that does not relax the underlying constrains at the
same time, e.g., ‘‘Maximize the number of intersections
between the rows of pennies’’, or ‘‘Maximize the number
of pennies that mutually share pennies with other rows’’
might relax the line and the separate rows constraints too.
Even if there was an unambiguous hint, we would expect
no effect, just like in the nine-dot problem, where the
instruction to draw lines outside the boundary of the given
nine dots fails to increase solution rate (see O¨llinger et al.,
2014). We suggest that further studies need to investigate
this claim in more detail.
Surprisingly, even in the maximization group not all
participants were able to solve the problem (28 % failed).
We predicted that the hints (line ? intersections ? maxi-
mization) would relax all main causes of problem diffi-
culty. This assumption was proven wrong. Either there is
still an additional source of difficulty, or the application of
the maximization heuristic overstrained some participants
(processing factor).
The inefficiency of hints was found in several other
insight studies (Chronicle et al., 2001; Kershaw et al.,
2013; O¨llinger et al., 2014; Weisberg, & Alba, 1981a, b).
There is also evidence for the importance of the processing
factor for solving multi-step problems. MacGregor et al.
(2001) pointed out that a higher look-ahead value (see
introduction) is helpful to solve the nine-dot problem, since
a higher value allows realizing the violation of a progress
monitoring criterion earlier. Importantly, a higher look-
ahead value is associated with a higher working memory
capacity. In fact, Chein et al. (2010) demonstrated for the
nine-dot problem that participants with a higher spatial
working memory span drew lines more likely to non-dot
points, and benefited effectively from hints. Ash and Wiley
(2006) investigated the influence of individual working
memory differences on solving insight problems that
allowed either multiple moves or only a few moves in a
biased problem representation. The authors’ rationale was
that only solving the first class of problems should benefit
from a higher working memory span, because initially
these problems require restricting the search space before a
representational change could occur, so that the appropriate
search space could be used. Although the authors used
problems that had a smaller search space (like the eight-
coin problem, Ormerod et al., 2002), we believe that for the
ten-penny problem individual working memory differences
could play an important role too. It seems plausible to
assume that higher variation rates of successful solvers
might be closely linked to a higher working memory span,
allowing the problem solver to keep track of the history of
solution attempts preventing to repeat unsuccessful solu-
tion attempts. This ought to be investigated in further
studies.
Comparing solvers and non-solvers emphasized the
importance of varying solution attempts. Recently, Fedor,
Szathma´ry, & O¨llinger (2015) found that non-solvers
repeated their unsuccessful moves more often than solvers
in the five-square problem. We suggest that repeating
unsuccessful strategies could lead to a self-generated
mental set, which in turn, hinders progress; an assumption
that is coherent with the early experimental findings on
mental set (Birch, & Rabinowitz, 1951; Luchins, &
Luchins, 1959; Luchins, 1942). These studies showed that
the repeated activation of a successful strategy makes
people ‘‘blind’’ for a more efficient or alternative method
(see also Bilalic´, McLeod, & Gobet, 2008, 2010). O¨llinger
et al. (2008) showed that the repeated activation of a newly
learned insightful solution strategy can even block well-
known prior knowledge strategies (see also Chi, & Snyder,
2011). However, in the current study mental set did not
result from the repeated activation of a successful strategy,
but from the repeated activation of an unsuccessful
strategy.
A next reasonable step would be to investigate the
expectation and monitoring process of participants when
they solve insight problems, and to prevent them from
entering a self-generated mental set, instead, increasing the
variation of potential solution strategies (Beeftink et al.,
2008).
Implications for insight problem solving
Does it make sense to classify the ten-penny problem as
an insight problem? Or is it a problem that could be
solved by search (Newell, & Simon, 1972) and should be
regarded as nothing special? We opt for the first. Gener-
ally, we stated (see O¨llinger et al., 2014) that all ‘‘clas-
sical insight problems’’ (Dow, & Mayer, 2004; Metcalfe,
& Wiebe, 1987; Weisberg, 1995) could be solved with or
without insight. The key component that might charac-
terize an insight problem is the problem solvers’ need for
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a representational change (Fleck, & Weisberg, 2013;
Ohlsson, 1992; O¨llinger, & Knoblich, 2009). For the ten-
penny problem, it seems plausible that there are con-
straints that have to be relaxed, like using lines or inter-
sections, and this makes it ‘‘something special’’. As our
data show, relaxing constraints and finding new and
efficient strategies to restrict the search space was not
trivial. It was shown that mainly variation scores after
hints predict whether the problem will be solved or not.
Taken together the variation data showed that our hints
helped to relax the constraints and enhanced the problem
solving process.
Our findings could be seen as complementary to the
existing evidence about the nine-dot problem (see ‘‘Intro-
duction’’). This might reconcile the opposing positions of
Kaplan and Simon (1990) and Ohlsson (1992, 2011). While
the former assumed that insight problems are difficult due
to an ill-defined problem representation that results in a
much too large search space, the latter suggested that
insight problems are difficult (among other things) due to
an overconstrained problem representation. We suggest
that these assumptions only differ in the importance and
function that they attribute to constraints and heuristics in
the respective problem.
Typically, in the nine-dot problem, problem solvers start
searching in an overconstrained but still large search space,
then after repeated failures, they relax the perceptual con-
straint to attain a search space that allows to make non-dot
turns and contains the solution (Kershaw, & Ohlsson,
2004), which in turn has to be restricted by heuristics
(O¨llinger et al., 2014). As MacGregor et al. (2001) con-
clusively showed the difficulty was not to find the maxi-
mization criterion, but to apply the maximization criterion
at the appropriate search space, a process that benefits from
higher spatial working memory capacity (Chein et al.,
2010).
In contrast, the ten-penny problem requires relaxing
constraints to restrict the large search space from the
beginning, and a large number of successful solvers real-
ized this need very early. Doing so allows applying the
maximization criterion to come up with the solution.
Bringing together lines, intersections, and the realization
how the number of intersections have to be maximized
could be seen as the main insight into the solution of the
problem. It might sound paradoxical; but for the ten-penny
problem, the relaxation of constraints restricts the search
space in contrast to several other studies, where constraint
relaxation increases the size of the search space (Ash, &
Wiley, 2006; Kershaw et al., 2013; Kershaw, & Ohlsson,
2004; Knoblich et al., 1999; Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney,
2001; MacGregor et al., 2001; O¨llinger, Jones, Faber, &
Knoblich, 2013; O¨llinger et al., 2008; O¨llinger et al.,
2013a, b).
Conclusions
We think that our study enhances the ‘‘special view’’ by
demonstrating the concerted interplay of heuristics and
representational change and supports the multiple causes of
difficulty account of insight problem solving (Kershaw, &
Ohlsson, 2004). Moreover, we think that our study provides
a better understanding of the dynamics of insight problem
solving at least for multi-step problems. We found that
maximization and variation of solution attempts might be
beneficial to solve the problem. We propose that higher
variation rates help efficient search of the search space and
to avoid the repetition of unsuccessful solution attempts.
The first might be crucially dependent on a higher working
memory capacity (Ash, & Wiley, 2006; Chein et al., 2010)
that helps guiding attention to unvisited states of the search
space, and at the same time keeping track of the overall
problem solving process.
Finally, we propose that our findings about the impor-
tance of variation are in harmony with evolutionary
accounts of problem solving and creativity (Campbell,
1960; Dietrich, & Haider, 2014; Fernando, Goldstein, &
Szathma´ry, 2010; Fernando, Szathma´ry, & Husbands,
2012; Simonton, 1995). If evolution might be in fact at play
at the neuronal level, it is not surprising that a larger
variation among candidate hypotheses is crucial for the
evolution of the solution.
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